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Abstract. This chapter analyzes the inuence of democratic institutions|specically, the eects
of (i) electoral uncertainty when individuals within a nation have dierent preferences over public
peaceful investment and (ii) greater checks and balances that lead to a more eective mobilization
of resources for both public peaceful investment and arming|on a nation's incentive to arm and
willingness to initiate war. The analysis is based on a model where nations contest some given
resource and where they cannot commit to their future allocations to arming; yet, the victor in a
conict today gains an advantage in future conict and thus realizes a savings in future arming.
These assumptions imply that, despite the short-term incentives to settle peacefully, one or both
nations might choose to initiate war. In such a setting, electoral uncertainty tends to make a
democracy more peaceful relative to an autocracy, whereas greater checks and balances tend to
make a democracy less peaceful. Thus, while two democracies might be more peaceful than two
autocracies when paired against each other in a contest over a given resource, this is not necessarily
the case. Even under conditions where democracies are most likely to be peaceful with one another,
democracies are at least as likely to be in war with autocracies as autocracies are likely to be in war
each other.
JEL Classication: D30, D70, D72, D74, D78, F51.
Keywords: international conict, domestic conict, peaceful settlement, political institutions.
1 Introduction
A voluminous literature shows that democratic nations rarely wage war against each other|
the so-called the \democratic peace." This empirical nding holds even when controlling for
geography, alliances, and development (see Chan 1997 for a survey). But, are democratic
nations generally more pacic than nondemocratic nations? The evidence here is somewhat
mixed (e.g., Rousseau et al., 1996). Specically, some have found that democracies are
generally less prone to conict (e.g., Benoit, 1996), while others have found that democracies
are at least as likely to ght autocracies as autocracies are to ght each other (e.g., Maoz and
yWritten for inclusion in the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conict. The author
wishes to thank, without implicating, Alex Debs and Stergios Skaperdas for especially helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this paper.Abdolali, 1989; Oneal and Russett, 1997).1 In any case, it is clear that there is something
fundamentally dierent about foreign policy making in democracies.
What accounts for these dierences? Scholars have generally taken two approaches in
answering this question. The rst emphasizes dierences in norms. Leaders of democracies
are guided by norms of compromise and cooperation, and so are less prone to conict
(e.g., Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1993; and, Dixon and Senese, 2002). Such norms
apply especially when democracies interact with each other. But, insofar as these norms
are relevant for democratic leaders when dealing with autocratic leaders as well as with
other democratic leaders, this approach is consistent with the notion that democracies are
generally more pacic.2
The second approach emphasizes structural dierences implied by dierent political in-
stitutions. For example, greater checks and balances in a democratic state can constrain
its leaders in mobilizing resources for the war eort (e.g., Morgan and Campbell, 1992;
and, Russett, 1993). A variant of this approach|one that is more prominent in the recent
literature|highlights the eect of regime types on the link between the incumbent's like-
lihood of remaining in power and the outcome of a war. For example, Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003) nd that leaders in democracies devote more resources to arming, but are less
likely to participate in a risky war, because their survival in oce depends on satisfying a
larger winning coalition. Although victory yields resources enjoyed by all to help the leader
remain in power, the loss in resources associated with defeat can jeopardize the leader's
incumbency. As a result, democracies might not ght each other because each expects the
other to expend much eort, making such wars riskier. Autocratic rulers tend to devote
more of their resources to satisfy a smaller winning coalition, and this can be done through
the provision of private goods. Consequently, the survival of autocratic rulers depends less
on the outcome of the war, and their willingness to ght democracies is roughly the same
as their willingness to ght other autocracies.
Hess and Orphanides (1995) similarly assume that the war outcome has implications for
a democratic leader's survival in power, but only to the extent that the war outcome provides
new information to the voting public about the leader's ability to handle the economy. That
is to say, a democratic leader possibly has a diversionary motive for going to war. However,
as recognized by Hess and Orphanides (2001), there can also be an appropriative motive
for going to war for both democracies and non-democracies. Since the net benets of such
1See Boehmer (2008) for a discussion of the more recent evidence, which appears to lend more support
to the notion that democracies are generally less prone to war.
2More recently, Fearon (2008) supposes that democracies, in contrast to autocracies, are committed to
extending the same rights and privileges (equal taxation and the provision of public goods) enjoyed by their
citizens to the inhabitants of successfully conquered territories. In the case that there are two democracies
with constant returns to scale in government, little is to be gained by seizing some of the opponent's territory.
The likelihood of conict is greater where one of the two countries is an autocracy, and greatest when both
countries are autocracies.
2wars are more disproportionately enjoyed by the ruling elite in a non-democracy than in
a democracy, this motive tends to be stronger for autocracies.3 Nevertheless, while it is
possible that a more democratic world is more peaceful, this is not necessarily the case.
In a similar vein, Baliga, Lucca and Sj ostr om (2007) emphasize the importance of ac-
countability in the political survival of elected leaders, supposing that dictators remain in
power regardless of the outcome of conict, whereas leaders of democracies must appease the
median voter to remain in power. Full democracies are distinguished from limited democra-
cies in terms of the identity of the critical voter whose support is required for the leader to
remain in power. In a full democracy, the critical voter corresponds with the median voter
who prefers the leader to respond to aggression with aggression, but aggression without
cause would result in the dismissal of the leader. By contrast, the critical voter in limited
democracies exhibits a hawkish bias (relative to the median voter). Under these assump-
tions, limited democracies tend to exhibit more aggression than either full democracies or
autocracies.4
But, while it seems obvious that the rate of turnover of leadership in a democracy is
greater than that in an autocracy, Debs and Goemans (2009), building on the empirical
work of Chiozza and Goemans (2004), question the notion that the likelihood of remaining
in power for a democratic leader is more sensitive to the outcome of conict. Under the
reasonable assumption that the process by which autocratic rulers are replaced is generally
more violent than the process of replacing elected leaders, the cost of losing power for
an autocratic ruler is greater than that for a democratic leader. At the same time, since
the strength of a leader's means of coercion is positively related to the nation's success in
conict and this coercive apparatus plays a larger role in the survival of an autocratic ruler
than in the survival of a democratic leader, an autocratic ruler's tenure is more sensitive
to the outcome of conict.5 With these results, Debs and Goemans (2010) oer a new
perspective on the democratic peace hypothesis. In particular, democratic leaders view
making concessions as less costly, rst because the outcome of the conict has less inuence
on the leader's probability of survival, and second because the costs of losing power are
smaller.
The present chapter takes an entirely dierent approach, one that emphasizes, along the
lines of Garnkel (1994), the combined roles of (i) dierences in preferences of individuals
3Also see Jackson and Morelli (2007), who emphasize the mechanisms that determine the extent to which
leaders internalize the costs of war relative to the benets. In particular, they suppose the net benets to
war for autocratic rulers are higher relative to the net benets for the country as a whole, giving rise to a
general bias for autocracies to wage war; the closer is the match between the net benets of war realized by
the leader and the net benets realized by the general population, the smaller is the bias.
4Also see Baliga and Sj ostr om (this volume). With a focus on the opportunities for international cooper-
ation (through repeated interactions), Conconi et al. (2009) highlight the importance of term limits, which
hinder the eectiveness of political accountability and make democracies more conict prone.
5They provide additional evidence of this implication. Also see Rosato (2003).
3within a nation that play out through the political process and (ii) electoral uncertainty.6
At the same time, along the lines of North and Weingast (1989), this chapter supposes
that checks and balances within a democracy need not make the mobilization of resources
more dicult. Instead, in a consolidated democracy where checks and balances are rmly
in place, the incumbent leader's access to resources will be greater. The analysis eshes
out the implications of these features of democratic institutions within a setting wherein
nations contest some given resource. It does so considering rst the incentive to arm and
second the incentive to initiate war. The case of an autocracy|where there is no electoral
uncertainty and mobilizing resources for public peaceful investment and arming is more
dicult|is taken as the benchmark for comparison.
Diering preferences among individuals within a nation translate into a disagreement
between the current and potential future policymakers about the allocation of resources
that, combined with electoral uncertainty, inuences the current policymaker's choice about
arming. In particular, insofar as the potential benet of arming today is to capture resources
in the future and the current and potential future policymakers disagree over the allocation
of such resources, electoral uncertainty induces greater discounting of the future, and thereby
tends to weaken the nation's incentive arm. Hence, although a policymaker's survival
probability is important here, the potential relevance of a nation's political institutions
in determining how success in conict might inuence that probability is not essential to
explaining the democratic peace. However, insofar as democratic institutions enable the
policymaker to convert taxed resources (which reduce private investment) more eectively
into public peaceful investment and arms, such institutions tend to strengthen a nation's
incentive to arm.
An extension of the analysis, following Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000) among others,
considers explicitly the possibility of peaceful settlement along with nations' arming de-
cisions in a general equilibrium setting. The possibility of peaceful settlement itself gives
rise to two possible outcomes: (i) arming with ghting and (ii) arming without ghting.
While settlement would be preferred over ghting in a static setting, one or both nations
might prefer to ght in a dynamic setting, particularly when there is incomplete contract-
ing/commmitment regarding the nations' future allocation of resources to arms. For the
victor in a conict today gains an upper hand in any future contest over resources, and
in doing so realizes some savings in the form of reduced future arming. As the future be-
comes more salient, the incentive to ght today increases. Hence, electoral uncertainty,
which eectively induces more discounting of the future by the current policymaker, tends
to make that policymaker less war prone. Yet, a greater ability to mobilize resources in
6This emphasis on the eect of electoral uncertainty makes no a priori assumptions about the inuence
of the conict outcome on democratic leader's likelihood of survival. In equilibrium, there is no inuence.
Still, the analysis is consistent with the notion that, abstracting from the war outcome, the likelihood a
democratic leader will be replaced is greater than that for an autocratic ruler (Debs and Goemans, 2010).
4general implies a greater incentive to arm and hence a greater potential savings in future
arming|particularly, if the nation emerges as a victor in today's conict|and thereby
tends to make a democratic leader more war prone. That is to say, dierences in con-
straints on mobilization for a democracy could make the democratic peace less likely. The
analysis suggests further that, even when the conditions that favor the democratic peace
are satised, democracies could be at least as likely to ght autocracies as two autocracies
are likely to ght each other.
In what follows, the next section lays out the basic framework. Section 3 examines the
implications for a nation's incentive to arm, while section 4 examines the general equilibrium
implications for arming and war initiation. Finally, section 5 oers some concluding remarks.
2 Basic framework
The analysis builds on a simplied and modied version of Garnkel's (1994) two-period
framework of resource allocation under alternative political arrangements|democracy and
autocracy|when resource endowments are not secure. The economy is populated by J
consumers/voters, who are indexed by j = 1;2;:::;J. At the beginning of each period
t = 1;2, consumers receive an identical endowment of some basic resource, Zt, which is
neither storable nor directly consumable. Of this endowment, individual j allocates i
j
t units
to production. The total output enjoyed by individual j depends not only on this allocation,
but also on the government's allocation to two types of public (peaceful) investment, nt =





t) + jnAt + (1   j)nBt; t = 1;2; (1)
where  2 (0;1) and j 2 [0;1]. According to this specication, individuals having a larger
j (> 1
2) enjoy a larger output, given their private investment (i
j
t), when nAt is higher than
nBt. For example, one type of peaceful investment (say nAt) might be more directly linked to
the building of human capital, while the other (nBt) is more directly linked to the building
of physical capital.
While the exact nature of the dierence in the two types of public peaceful investment is
not important, it is important that individuals dier in their preferences dened over them,
as reected in the parameter j, which is distributed over the interval [0;1]. Variation in j
across individuals could arise from real dierences in technology, business type or location.
Alternatively, variation in j could be interpreted as a conict over the distribution of
resources. In this case, nt can be thought of as a lump sum distribution from the government
nanced by taxes imposed on each individual. Each individual pays the same tax and
receives the same distribution of nAt and nBt, but for individuals with a larger j (> 1
2),
the benet of nAt is marginally greater; for individuals with a smaller j (< 1
2), the benet
5of nBt is marginally greater. Under either interpretation, given the resources available (Zt),
this variation translates into a general disagreement about the desired composition of public
peaceful investment.7
In a democratic regime, the identity of the incumbent is given for period t = 1; at
the end that period (t = 1) before Z2 is realized and any period t = 2 allocations are
made, individuals vote to elect a policymaker/party to take oce in period t = 2.8 Each
individual's j is constant over the two periods. However, suppose in addition that there
are unpredictable changes in the distribution of voters, driven for example by random
voting shocks which inuence the individual's decision of whether or not to participate
in the electoral process or by possible future changes in the criteria dening the voting
population. This assumption implies that the identity of the median voter is not the same
from period to period, and hence there is uncertainty about the future election outcome. In
this framework, the autocratic regime is viewed as a degenerate case of democracy. That is
to say, the incumbent (autocratic) ruler remains in power with certainty.
Under either regime, the leader imposes an identical lump sum tax, t, on each individ-
ual. The proceeds can be transformed into nonmilitary (or peaceful) public investment (nt)
and military goods (mt), both measured in per capita terms, as follows:
t = [nAt + nBt + mt] t = 1;2; (2)
where  2 [1;R]. The case where  = 1 is viewed as that where checks and balances are
suciently high (as in a consolidated democracy) to allow the government (led by either of
the two parties) to transform tax revenues into public spending (nt or mt) on a one-to-one
basis. But, where  > 1, the state's ability to obtain resources to allocate to such spending
is limited, and more so the larger is .9 The analysis views an autocracy as having the least
amount of checks and balances, such that  = R > 1.
Following the growing literature on the economics of conict, the analysis assumes that
7Garnkel (1994) supposes, by contrast, that the disagreement among individuals within the nation
concerns the composition of public investment and private investment. The approach adopted here allows
for a more transparent analysis of the eects of political institutions as they inuence the ability of the
incumbent to mobilize resources for either type of public peaceful investment and arming.
8While the precise timing of the realization of Z2 relative to the election for choosing the second period
leader does not matter in this analysis of this section where we consider only the leader's mobilization eorts,
it does matter in section 4 where we consider, in addition, the decision of whether to settle peacefully or to
initiate war.
9Note North and Weingast (1989) argue that institutional arrangements that enhance checks and balances
would work to enhance the government's ability to raise revenues through credit markets. However, the
present chapter abstracts from debt nance. Even so, North and Weingast's arguments would apply more
generally to the government's ability to obtain resources, whether it be through taxation or borrowing. A
more fully articulated model might suppose that, with fewer checks and balances, individuals have a greater
incentive to engage in tax avoidance activities, thereby limiting the ability of the government to obtain funds
to nance public spending. Also see Lake (1992).
One could assume that the state's eectiveness in mobilizing resources for security purposes diers from
that in mobilizing resources for public investment; however, the qualitative results would remain unchanged.
6military spending augments the fraction of world resources secured by the nation.10 Given
the amount of military spending by other nations, increased military spending increases the
endowment received by each individual equally, but not until the following period:
Zt = z(mt 1) t = 1;2; (3)
given m0, where z() is at least twice continuously dierentiable and zm  @z(mt)=@mt is
strictly positive and decreasing. While this specication reects a strong assumption that
current military spending has no possible benets in the current period, it is only important
that the potential benets of such spending are not fully realized in the current period|i.e.,
in a democracy, during the incumbent's term. As discussed below in section 4, z() depends
not only on the state of technology available to the nation to grab contestable resources,
but also on other nations' military spending. However, since the focus here initially treats
military spending by other nations as exogenous, that notation is suppressed for now.
2.1 Optimization by voters/consumers
Voters/consumers have identical preferences dened over current and future consumption,
c
j







j = 1;2;:::;J; (4)
where  2 (0;1] reects the individual's time preference, which is constant across j; and E1
denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available in the beginning of
period t = 1. One source of uncertainty in this model arises as the identity of the median
voter and hence the identity of the policymaker to be elected in period t = 2 is not known|
particularly in the democratic regime. However, as described below in section 4, under both
democratic and autocratic regimes there could also be uncertainty regarding the outcome
of the conict between nations.
The assumption that the endowment cannot be consumed directly and is non-storable
implies that the individual's investment decision is trivial. In particular, taking the current
and expected future tax and public spending policies as given, each individual j chooses i
j
t





t;nt;j) and (ii) i
j
t  Zt   t. The solution to this problem takes the following
form:
it = Zt   t t = 1;2; (5)
for all j. The only interesting decision made by individuals in a democracy concerns which
10See Garnkel and Skaperdas (2007) for an overview of this literature.
7political party to support in the election at the end of period t = 1. Given j, this decision
depends on the policies expected to be implemented by each party if elected. As previously
mentioned, the identity of the policymaker in an autocracy is taken to be exogenous.
2.2 Optimization by policymakers
Assume that, for democracies, there are just two political parties, indexed by k = I;N.
The incumbent in the initial period (t = 1) is denoted by k = I, and the party not initially
in power but still representing a potential successor in the next period (t = 2) is denoted
by k = N. Dierences in their preferences,  k, which correspond to dierent groups of
voters/consumers, result in a disagreement between the parties about the composition of
public peaceful investment. In particular, each party k = I;N aims to choose spending and






where G(it;nt;k) is given by (1) and k 2 [0;1] for k = I;N. To x ideas, the analysis
assumes that the incumbent party, k = I, representing those individuals with j = I, has
a relatively greater preference for nAt, whereas the other party, k = N, that represents those
individuals with j = N, has a relatively greater preference for nBt: 0  N < 1
2 < I 
1.11 These preferences are common knowledge.
In a democratic regime, both voters and policymakers face uncertainty at the beginning
of period t = 1 about the identity of the period t = 2 policymaker. Let the probability that
the incumbent (of a democracy) is reelected in period t = 2 be denoted by P; then, 1   P
denotes the probability that party k = N is elected in period t = 2. Suppose further that
the incumbent takes P as given. As will become obvious below, under the assumption that
voters are rational and forward-looking, neither party can make false promises in equilibrium
about spending policies to be implemented in the future. Each can credibly promise to
implement only those policies considered optimal once in power in period t = 2. Given the
preferences of the two political parties, the equilibrium determination of P depends only on
the identity of median voter.
The ruler of an autocracy (indexed by k = R) has preferences also represented by (6),
but with P = 1.
3 Electoral uncertainty and equilibrium military spending
In studying the policymaker's equilibrium military spending policies that take the other
nations' policies as given, the analysis assumes that the endowments received in the two
11The particular ordering of their preferences (I vs. N) is not important, only that there exists dis-
agreement between the two parties. The analysis to follow also considers (as a benchmark case) the outcome
where there is no disagreement (I = N).
8periods, if strictly positive, are suciently large to ensure that the policymaker's optimizing
choice of public peaceful investment is strictly positive: nk
At + nk
Bt > 0.12 Then, given the
time separability of preferences, the analysis can rst characterize the parties' preferred
peaceful investment policies for a given military spending policy, and subsequently turn to
the incumbent's choice of military spending in period t = 1.13 For now, note that, regardless
of the identity of the policymaker in period t = 2 (whether it be representing party k = I;N
in a democracy or an autocratic ruler k = R), m2 = 0 in this two-period setting.
3.1 The policymaker's preferred peaceful investment
The policymaker of each party k, if in power in period t, chooses the composition of peaceful
investment to maximize G(it;nt;k) subject to individuals' choice of it (5) and the budget
constraint (2), for a given endowment net of the resource costs of military spending in that
period, z(mt 1)   mt. The rst-order conditions to this static problem are given by (2),
(5) and the following
 i 1
t + k  0 (7a)
 i 1
t + (1   k)  0 (7b)
for k = I in t = 1 and k = I;N in t = 2. These conditions, conditional on m0, m1
and m2 = 0, require that the marginal benets of private peaceful (it) and public peaceful
investment (nt) be balanced against each other. Since public peaceful investment enters
linearly into G(it;nt;k), the assumption that I > 1
2 > N implies that both (7a) and
(7b) cannot hold as strict equalities for either party, k. In particular, party k = I having a
relatively greater preference for nAt chooses nBt = 0, whereas party k = N chooses nAt = 0.
The rst-order conditions to party k's static optimization problem then imply the following










































1  for k = N:
(8b)
t = 1;2, where as previously mentioned m2 = 0.
For t = 1 these solutions with k = I represent the optimizing choices of the incumbent
12If Zt = 0, a possible outcome when war breaks out as considered in section 4, no allocation decisions
are to be made.
13In this case, the policymaker's choice of public peaceful investment follows from a static optimization
problem, while her choice of military spending follows from a dynamic optimization problem.
9in the rst period. They are the actual allocations for that period. For t = 2, these solutions
represent the policymakers' preferred policies that would be implemented if in power then.
These policies are the only ones that can be credibly announced in any campaign platform
prior to the election that takes place at the end of period t = 1. Note from (8b), that the
focus on an interior optimum (nk
t > 0) implicitly assumes z(mt 1)   mt is suciently
large, and that this assumption is stronger the greater is the tax ineciency ().
Maintaining this assumption, the solutions shown in (8) reveal that the preferred com-
position of resources allocated to peaceful investment from z(mt 1) mt, depends on the
ineciency of taxation, , and the policymaker's preferences, k. In particular, given k,
the optimizing level of public peaceful investment (nk
t ) falls relative to the optimizing level
of private investment (ik
t ) as taxation becomes less ecient (i.e., as  rises). Given the
degree of tax ineciency , a larger weight attached to the policymaker's preferred public
peaceful investment, I for k = I and 1 N for k = N, implies that more resources are al-
located to public investment, nt, and fewer resources are allocated to private investment, it.
With (3), these solutions also imply that public peaceful investment in period t is increasing
in the current t period endowment and thus mt 1. As emphasized below, the dependence
of the policymaker's optimizing peaceful investment/tax policies on the previous period's
military spending and the disagreement between the two parties has important implications
for party k = I's arming decision in period t = 1.
These solutions and equations (2), (3), and (5) imply that party I's rst-period indirect
utility can be written as a function of m0 and m1:













Party I's second-period indirect utility, conditional on arming in period t = 1 and being
reelected in period t = 2, can be written as a function of m1:
































The analysis of the next section uses these expressions to characterize the incumbent's
rst-period choice for military spending.
103.2 The optimizing choice of military spending
The incumbent leader in period t = 1 takes into account the potential inuence of her
choice of m1 on the potential successor's (k = N) peaceful investment/tax policies and





GI(z(m0)   m1) + [P ^ GI(m1) + (1   P) ^ GNI(m1)]
o
; (12)
where the indirect utility functions are dened above in (9) given m0, (10), and (11).




^ I = 0; (13)
where ^ I  PI + (1   P)(1   I)  I.14 The rst term in this condition represents the
marginal cost of military spending in terms of current foregone public (peaceful) investment
and thus period t = 1 consumption. The second term represents the discounted value of the
marginal benet of military spending in terms of the additional resources secured for public
peaceful investment and thus period t = 2 consumption. This marginal benet accounts
for the disagreement between the incumbent and the potential successor and the perceived
\distortion" in choice of public peaceful investment in the case that she is not reelected.
Note, in particular, given the assumptions that I > 1
2 and P < 1, the weight attached
to this benet in terms of the additional public peaceful investment made possible with an
additional unit of military spending, ^ I, is strictly less than I. Note further that (13) with
P = 1 and  = R represents the rst-order condition for the autocratic ruler's optimizing
choice of military spending. For future reference, let mI
1 denote the optimizing choice of
military spending for the incumbent leader of a democracy and mR
1 denote that for an
autocratic ruler.
The optimizing choice of military spending, as implicitly dened by (13), generally is a
function of the policymaker's time preference (), the ineciency of taxation () and the
probability of re-election (P). Regardless of the political regime in place, it is clear from
(13) that the discounted marginal benet from military spending today is increasing in .
Then, it follows from the assumed concavity of z() that the optimizing choice of military
spending depends positively on . Thus, as the future becomes relatively more important,
the leader|whether she be elected or an autocratic ruler|chooses a higher level of military
spending.
To consider the implications of democratic institutions, as reected in the dierence
14Note that ^ I  I holds as a strict inequality whenever the incumbent leader faces electoral uncertainty
(i.e., P < 1) and has a relative preference for nA (i.e., I >
1
2) while the potential successor has a relative
preference for nB (i.e., N <
1
2). If either I = N =
1
2 or P = 1, then ^ I = I.
11between mI and mR given the (pure) time preferences of individuals and leaders (), it
is useful to start with the case where there is no disagreement between the two political
parties: I = N = 1
2. From (8), one can verify that, in this case, the peaceful investment


















for k = I;N, implying that the indirect utility when reelected (10) is identical to that when
not reelected (11).15 Thus, in this case, the probability of reelection for party k = I has
no relevance for the marginal benet of military spending. This result remains intact more
generally if I = N 6= 1
2.
Indeed, the case of no disagreement between the incumbent and the potential successor
(I = N) is identical to that where P = 1: neither the incumbent party's preferred type
of public peaceful investment nor the probability of reelection has any relevance for the
optimizing choice of military spending in period t = 1. This point can be veried by noting
that, when I = N so that ^ I = I, the rst-order condition (13) simplies as follows:
 1 + zm(m1)= = 0: (14)
This condition with  = R, also implicitly denes the autocratic ruler's optimizing military
spending as a function of the ineciency of taxation, . Applying the implicit function
theorem to (14), while invoking the second-order condition, one can easily verify that the
optimizing choice of military spending is negatively related to the tax ineciency parameter.
Thus, given military spending by the rival country, equilibrium military spending will be
strictly greater in a democracy with a homogeneous population than in an autocracy: mI
1 
mR
1 holds when I = N and as a strict inequality for  < R.
However, a similar line of reasoning shows that, when there is disagreement between the
two political parties, electoral uncertainty has an osetting eect on the incumbent party's
optimizing choice of m1 relative to that of the autocrat. In particular, given I > 1
2 > N,
an exogenous decrease in P implies a lower value for ^ I  PI + (1   P)(1   I) and thus
a decrease in the overall marginal benet of military spending. Since the marginal cost is
unaected, the incumbent party's optimizing choice of military spending mI
1 is necessarily
decreasing in the probability of being replaced by the other party.16
15To be sure, when I = N =
1
2, the composition of nt is not determined. Here I assume, without any
loss of generality, that both parties split that allocation evenly between nA and nB.
16By the same token, given P < 1, an increase in I >
1
2, which since N <
1
2 would indicate an increase
in the degree to which the two political parties disagree, implies a smaller net marginal benet from military
spending, and thus a smaller m
I
1 . In a more general setting, but one that abstracts from possible tax
ineciencies, Garnkel (1994) shows similarly that an increase in the degree to which the parties disagree
12This discussion reveals that democratic institutions potentially produce two osetting
eects on a country's military spending relative to military spending by an autocrat, given
military spending by the rival nation: the greater eciency of taxation (i.e., a smaller value
for ) tends to add to military spending, while electoral uncertainty given disagreement
between the political parties tends to reduce military spending. Thus, although democratic
institutions can induce lower military spending even when the likelihood of reelection for
the incumbent is independent of the outcome of the war, such institutions and the associ-
ated constraints do not necessarily imply lower military spending. The Appendix conrms
that the net eect on equilibrium military spending by an elected policymaker relative to
that by an autocratic ruler (whether larger or smaller) is consistent with the equilibrium
determination of P.
4 Implications for international conict: Peaceful settlement versus war
initiation
The analysis now turns to study the implications of democratic institutions for international
conict. The objective is to consider further how these institutions inuence the incentives
of leaders to mobilize resources to the conict in a more general equilibrium framework,
supposing that two countries contest a given resource. At the same time, the analysis
permits a distinction between mobilization and actual conict, to consider explicitly the
decision to settle peacefully or to initiate war. A critical assumption of the analysis is
that nations in conict cannot enter into binding commitments over the future allocation
of resources to arms; however, victory in a war today weakens the opponent and, therefore,
can help solve this problem.
Under settlement in period t, the division of world resources depends on mt 1 and ~ mt 1:
Zt = z(mt 1; ~ mt 1)Z and e Zt = [1   z(mt 1; ~ mt 1)]Z; (15a)
where the tilde () indicates values of the variable for the foreign nation and
z(mt 1; ~ mt 1) =
(
mt 1




for t = 1;2. The share of Z secured by the foreign nation is symmetrically dened as
z(~ mt 1;mt 1) = 1   z(mt 1; ~ mt 1), implying that Zt=e Zt = mt 1=~ mt 1 for t = 1;2.17 Ac-
about the allocation of resources to private investment vs. public peaceful investment can result in lower
military spending by the elected ocial. In that analysis, however, the disagreement implies that military
spending has a dynamic strategic eect not present here.
17This specication represents the simple ratio form of the contest success function, as rst introduced by
Tullock (1980). This functional form falls within the general class of contest success functions, axiomatized
by Skaperdas (1996): z(m; ~ m) = h(m)=[h(m) + h(~ m)], where h() is a non-negative, increasing function.
13cording to this specication, the resources secured by each nation under peaceful settlement
depends positively on its own allocation to military spending (m for the domestic nation
and ~ m for foreign nation) and negatively on the other nation's allocation.18
By contrast, under war in period t, the winner obtains the entire prize (or contested
resource) with some probability determined by both nations' previous military spending, as
in a \winner-take-all contest." In particular, the domestic nation wins the entire contested
resource, Z, in period t with probability z(mt 1; ~ mt 1), dened in (15b); the foreign nation
takes control of Z with probability z(~ mt 1;mt 1) = 1   z(mt 1; ~ mt 1).
The timing of events in period t = 1 is as follows:
Stage 1. Given the military spending choices from the previous period, m0 and ~ m0, the
leaders of each country come together to consider the peaceful division of Z according
to (15).19 If, however, the leader of at least one of the two nations nds this division
unacceptable, then the two engage in a winner-take-all contest.
Stage 2. Once the outcome of the period t = 1 conict is realized, whether it be through
peaceful settlement or war, the distribution of Z is determined. In the case of set-
tlement, the incumbent leaders of both nations make their allocations to peaceful
investment and military spending, and the one-period payos are realized. In the
case of war, only the victor has resources to allocate; the game eectively ends for the
losing nation.
Stage 3. An election takes place at the end of period t = 1 to choose the nation's leader
for period t = 2. In the case of an autocracy, the leader of period t = 1 remains in
power in the next period.
When the two nations settle peacefully in period t = 1, the rst two stages specied above
for period t = 1 are repeated in period t = 2. When war breaks out in period t = 1, there is
no conict at all in period t = 2; since the winner controls all of Z in this case, only stage
2 occurs and only for the winner.
As illustrated below, in a static version of this model (say starting in period t = 2),
both nations' leaders always have an incentive to settle peacefully. However, in the dynamic
setting presented here, an additional strategic consideration comes into play. In particular,
as in Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000), the setting described above implies that winning the
Hirshleifer (1989) investigates the properties of two important functional forms of this class, including the
\ratio success function," where h(m) = m
 with  > 0, which simplies to (15b) when  = 1. Also see the
chapter by Jia and Skaperdas in this volume.
18Note that the ecient frontier dening the highest payos for both nations under all possible distri-
butions of Z when no resources are allocated military spending is not linear. Thus, although the nations'
leaders are risk neutral and war is not assumed to be destructive, a peaceful division of the resources accord-
ing to the nations' winning probabilities does not correspond to the "split-the-surplus rule." See Anbarci et
al. (2002) for a discussion of a this and other rules derived from dierent bargaining solution concepts.
19As before, the analysis takes the identity of the period t = 1 incumbent as given.
14conict today (period t = 1) gives the victor a large advantage in the future conict (t = 2)
and savings in future arming; and, the possibility realizing the savings in future military
spending by ghting today can induce nations to initiate war, despite the short-term gains
from peaceful settlement.20 This section studies the role that political institutions|in
particular, electoral uncertainty and the eectiveness of resource mobilization|can play in
the period t = 1 decision to initiate war or settle peacefully.
In this dynamic setting, the decision by each nation to settle peacefully or to wage war
in period t = 1 inuences the amount of resources available to them not only in period t = 1,
but also in the next period. Assuming that the leaders are rational and forward-looking
parties, they will account for this inuence when choosing between war and settlement in
the rst period. Of course, doing so requires that they know what would occur in the
second period for each possible outcome (war and settlement) in period t = 1. Thus, in
accordance with the notion of subgame perfection, an appropriate equilibrium concept for
such dynamic games, the model is solved backwards, starting from the second and nal
period, t = 2.
4.1 Possible outcomes in the second period
To x ideas, suppose that the two nations are identical with respect to the number of
citizens J, peaceful investment technologies, and the preferences of citizens. For analytical
convenience, the analysis imposes symmetry in the political parties' preferences within each




2 = ~ iN
2 , and in addition that nI
A2 = nN
B2 and ~ nI
A2 = ~ nN
B2. But, while the quantities
allocated to peaceful investment, i and n, are the same for both parties (within each nation),
the preferred type of public peaceful investment diers. For example, the domestic nation's
party k = N would, if in power in period t = 2, allocate all public peaceful investment to
nB, while party k = I in the domestic nation allocates all such resources to nA. Despite
the disagreement within each nation, imposing this symmetry across the political parties
allows us to abstract from the identity of the incumbent leader in the second period.
20See McBride and Skaperdas (2009), who provide some experimental evidence in support of this hypoth-
esis. The analysis of this chapter, like Fearon (1995) and Powell (2006) as well as Garnkel and Skaperdas
(2000), points to commitment problems to explain the emergence of war, despite the short-run incentives
to settle. [See Jackson and Morelli (2007), who explore a variant of this explanation in connection with
the democratic peace hypothesis.] A complementary explanation relies on asymmetric information. [Re-
cent analyses taking this approach while focusing on the democratic peace hypothesis include Levy and
Razin (2004) and Tanger as (2009)]. Fearon (2008), in his analysis of \colonial" democracies (dened as
those democracies not committed to extending the rights and privileges enjoyed by their citizens to the
inhabitants of conquered territories) combines both approaches.
154.1.1 When the two nations settle peacefully in the rst period
At the beginning of period t = 2 given m1 and ~ m1, the leaders rst must choose whether
to negotiate a peaceful settlement or to ght.
Expected payos under settlement. When the leaders choose to settle peacefully, the
distribution of the contestable resource is given by (15). Then, one can easily conrm using
the solutions to peaceful investment as described above for an interior optimum (see also
(8)), the expected period t = 2 payos for the leaders of the domestic and foreign nations
under settlement, given settlement in period t = 1, are as follows:
^ Gk



























m1 + ~ m1

; (16b)
where the subscript \SS" indicates settlement in both periods. Not surprisingly these payos
are increasing in the nation's own military spending and decreasing in that of the opponent.
Expected payos under war. When war breaks out in period t = 2, the domestic nation
secures the entire endowment and the foreign nation secures no resources with probability
z(m1; ~ m1) = m1=(m1 + ~ m1); and with probability 1   z(m1; ~ m1) = ~ m1=(m1 + ~ m1), the
foreign nation secures the entire endowment and the domestic nation gets nothing. Thus,
the expected period t = 2 payos from going to war for the leaders (k) of the domestic and
foreign nations, given settlement in period t = 1, are given respectively by the following:
^ Gk
SW(m1; ~ m1) =
m1






























where the subscript \SW" indicates settlement in period t = 1 and war in the next period.
These expected payos are increasing in the nation's own military spending and decreasing
in that of the opponent.
Comparing the expected payos under settlement for each nation (16) with those under
war (17) shows that, given settlement in period t = 1 and any allocation to guns from
period t = 1, each nation's leader unambiguously prefers settlement in period t = 2. Thus,
given that the two nations settle peacefully in the rst period, they will settle peacefully in
the second. Note that this result depends on neither the policymakers' preferences nor the
16political institutions in place.
4.1.2 When the two nations go to war in the rst period
When war breaks out in the rst period, the winner receives the entire amount of the
contested resource, Z, leaving the loser with nothing. As a result, the loser has no resources
then to allocate to military spending and thus receives none of the endowment in the second.
Although this would seem to be an extreme assumption, it is captures in a very simple way
the notion that victory in war today can give that nation a strategic advantage in the
future.21 The victor of a war in the rst period is assured of securing all of Z not only
in that period (t = 1), but also in the future (t = 2) and without having to allocate any
resources in period t = 1 to military spending.22 Thus, victory by the domestic nation or
by the foreign nation in period t = 1 war implies respectively the following period t = 2
payos for the leader (k) of that nation:
^ Gk






















where the subscript \WV " indicates the victor of war in period t = 1. If the nation emerges
as the loser in the period t = 1 conict, then the period t = 2 payo for the leader of that
nation ( ^ Gk
WL for the domestic nation and e ^ G
k
WL for the foreign nation) is zero.
4.2 The decision to settle peacefully or go to war in the rst period
With the results above, the analysis now turns to examine the leaders' incentives to wage
war in period t = 1. This decision is made by each incumbent leader given the allocations
to military spending by both nations in the previous period: m0 and ~ m0.
21The analysis of Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996), conducted in a more general setting wherein the
production technology exhibits diminishing returns and complementarity in the two parties' inputs, suggests
the result that nations might choose to engage in conict despite the short-term incentive to settle peacefully
would follow through with a less extreme assumption regarding the fate of the defeated nation; all that is
required is that the defeated side's second-period initial resource is suciently small relative to that of the
victor as a result of combat.
22Strictly speaking, according to the specication in (15b), even if the other nation allocates nothing to
military spending, assurance of securing Z in the second period by the victor of the rst-period war requires
an innitesimal amount of resources be allocated to such spending. For simplicity, I assume that amount is
zero.
174.2.1 When the two nations settle peacefully
From section 4.1.1, it is clear that when the two nations settle peacefully in the rst period,
they will do the same in the second period. Recall also the assumption that N = 1   I,
implying that iI
2 = iN
2 and that nI
A2 = nN
B2. An analogous assumption for the foreign
nation implies that ~ iI
2 = ~ iN
2 and that ~ nI
A2 = ~ nN
B2. Assume further that I; ~ I > 1
2.23
Thus, the expected two-period payos for the leaders of the domestic nation and foreign
nation (k = I) are respectively given by
 I
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where as previously dened ^ I  PI + (1   P)(1   I)  I and similarly ~ ^ I  ~ P ~ I +
(1   ~ P)(1   ~ I)  ~ I. The rst line of each expression represents the period t = 1 payo
to the incumbent leader from settling peacefully. This rst-period payo is realized since
that leader controls the allocation of resources implied by the outcome of negotiations|
most notably, among the two types of public peaceful investment|in that period. While
there is no uncertainty about the allocation of world resources between the two countries in
period t = 2 under peaceful settlement, the period t = 2 payo is subject to uncertainty|
namely, electoral uncertainty. From the incumbent leaders' perspective in period t = 1,
this uncertainty gives rise to uncertainty about the allocation of future resources secured.
Only in the case where the incumbent of period t = 1 is reelected will that leader be able
to choose her most preferred type of public peaceful investment in the next period, nI
A2 for
the leader of the domestic nation and ~ nI
A2 for the leader of the foreign nation. Since the
allocation that would be chosen by the challenger (with N < 1
2 < I and ~ N < 1
2 < ~ I)
is viewed as suboptimal, the expected discounted period t = 2 payo , shown in the second
line of each expression, is less than what would be expected if the incumbent leader were
23To be sure, it is only important that the relative weight the incumbent of each nation attaches to nB
diers from the relative weight of the other party, so that the incumbent's indirect utility in period t = 2
when not elected will be less than that when elected given the incumbent's choice of m1. One could assume
that the leader of the foreign nation has a relative preference for nB. The assumption made here that both
have a relatively greater preference for nA only simplies the notation.
18reelected with probability equal to one.
4.2.2 When the two nations go to war
As noted earlier, when war breaks out in the rst period, the winner seizes all of Z in both
periods. Thus, the winner need not allocate any resources to military spending in the rst
period. The loser gets zero resources and thus a payo of zero in both periods. Hence,
the expected two-period payos from going to war in the rst period for the leaders of the













































































where ^ I and ~ ^ I are as dened previously. The rst line of each expression represents
the expected period t = 1 payo. The realized payo is strictly positive only in the case
of victory. Similarly, the second line (weighted by z(m0; ~ m0) for the domestic nation and
by 1   z(m0; ~ m0) for the foreign nation) represents the expected, discounted period t = 2
payo, with uncertainty coming both from the conict between nations and that between
the political parties within each nation.
4.3 War or peaceful settlement?
Using these expected two-period payos, the analysis now turns to consider the nations'
incentive to go to war. The two nations choose to settle peacefully in both periods, if
both  I
S >  I
W and e  I
S > e  I
W hold; otherwise, the nations go to war. Analyzing these
conditions can be quite complicated, even in this simple setting. The analysis to follow,
then, considers two separate cases: one where the two nations are identical in all respects
including their political institutions and the other where the two nations dier only in terms
of their political institutions.
194.3.1 Two identical nations
Suppose that the preferences of the two incumbent leaders and their nation's tax ine-
ciencies are identical. For simplicity assume further that m0 = ~ m0. With these additional
assumptions, it follows that z(m0; ~ m0) = 1 z(m0; ~ m0) = 1
2, z(m1; ~ m1) = 1 z(m1; ~ m1) = 1
2
and furthermore that P = ~ P so that ^ I = ~ ^ I. Then, the condition for the domestic nation
to prefer war in period t = 1 ( I
W >  I
S) is identical to that for the foreign nation to prefer
war (e  I
W > e  I
S), and can be written as follows:
mI



















As revealed by this condition, the incentive to go to war in period t = 1 depends on the
possible savings in military spending aorded through victory. If the leaders' optimizing
choice of military spending in period t = 1 under peaceful settlement is suciently high,
then the leader will choose war over peaceful settlement.
Evaluating the eect of the various parameters of interest on the emergence of war
requires one to account simultaneously for their eects on the incentive to arm and their
eects on  m1. To this end, let us reconsider the incentive to arm, looking at the rst-
order condition to the incumbents' choice for military spending (13) given the symmetry







^ I = 0;
for both nations, which implies the following solution in the symmetric outcome:24
mI







While the minimum amount of savings in future military spending to induce a nation to
initiate war ( m1) is independent of the size of the contested resource (Z), the solution above
reveals that the incentive to arm is increasing in Z.
Accordingly, the condition for the (identical) nations to prefer war over peaceful settle-
24Note that this symmetric solution is consistent with the earlier ndings of section 3.2. That is to
say, military spending in the symmetric outcome depends negatively on the ineciency of taxation  and
positively on the discount factor  and on the probability of reelection which implies an increase in ^ I < I.
In the extreme case where (i) P = 1 such that ^ I = I and (ii) R = , the solution for arming by the
two democratic leaders is identical to that when two autocratic rulers are contesting the resource, Z; in this
special case, the leaders' relative preference for public peaceful investment (I) has no eect on the incentive
to arm.
20ment (mI
1 >  m1) is that the contestable resource (Z) is suciently large:















Clearly, when  Z is smaller, this condition becomes weaker, and war is more likely to be
preferred over peaceful negotiation by the two nations' leaders.25 Regardless of the political
institutions in place (i.e., the values of P and ),  Z falls as the discount factor  rises.
Although an increase in  increases the minimum savings in period t = 1 military spending
required to make war preferable [ m1 shown in (21)], it also increases each contending nation's
incentive to arm [mI
1 shown in (22)], and the latter eect dominates. Thus, consistent with
the ndings of Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000) who abstract from political institutions, as
the future becomes more salient, the two nations have a greater incentive to initiate a war.
To analyze the inuence of democratic institutions on the likelihood of war, I follow the
approach taken earlier in section 3.2 when considering the eects of such institutions on the
incumbent leader's incentive to devote resources to military spending. Specically, I start
with the benchmark case where there is no disagreement between the political parties of
the two countries: I = 1   I = N = 1
2, which implies I = ^ I. Then, the condition in
(23) becomes










This condition shows that electoral uncertainty has no implications for either leader's in-
centive to go to war when the political parties within each nation agree about the allocation
of resources to public peaceful investment.
To x ideas, suppose that I = R. Then the condition above, with R substituted in for
, gives us the condition for the autocratic ruler to prefer war over peaceful settlement when
in conict with an identical autocracy. For future reference, let  ZRR denote that threshold,
and similarly let  ZDD denote generally (i.e., for any value of P < 1, I  1
2  1   I, and
  R) the threshold when the two nations are democracies. The only dierence between
 ZRR and the threshold value for a democracy with a homogeneous population,  ZDDj^ I=I
as shown in (24), is the tax ineciency of the autocracy. A greater tax ineciency, R
relative to , has two reinforcing eects. First, it implies a larger minimum savings in
military spending required to make war preferable to peaceful settlement ( m1); second it
implies a smaller equilibrium incentive to arm under peaceful settlement (mI
1 ). Hence, the
critical value of Z is increasing in , and the assumption that the ineciency of taxation in
25The analysis' focus on the case where the incumbent leaders allocate a strictly positive amount of the
endowment (when Z1 > 0) to public peaceful investment implicitly places a lower bound on Z; however,
that condition neither implies nor is implied by the condition in (23), without further restrictions on the
parameters|namely,  and , as well as I and P.
21an autocracy is greater than that in a democracy (R < ) implies that  ZDDj^ I=I <  ZRR,
so that democratic institutions, absent disagreement within either nation, imply a greater
incentive for the leaders to go to war.
However, along similar lines to what was seen in section 3.2, where there exists disagree-
ment between the political parties of each nation, democratic institutions can have an oset-
ting eect on the leader's incentive to go to war. In particular, when I > 1
2 > 1 I = N
in both nations, a decrease in each incumbent's probability of reelection implies a smaller
^ I  PI + (1   P)(1   I), which not only decreases the incentive to arm under peace-
ful settlement (mI
1 ), but also increases the minimum amount of future savings in military
spending that makes war preferable ( m1). Thus, as is clear from (23), an exogenous de-
crease in P (or equivalently ^ I given I) implies a larger threshold value of the contestable
resource,  ZDD, thereby making war less likely.26
Both of these implications are consistent with the predictions regarding the optimizing
choice of military spending. That is to say, arming is higher and war is more likely when (i)
the tax system is more ecient and (ii) when the incumbent is more likely to be reelected
in the second and last period. Although it is quite possible that two identical democracies
contesting some resource are less likely to initiate war against each other than are two
identical autocracies, this is not necessarily the case.27
4.3.2 A democracy versus an autocracy
Suppose now that one nation is a democracy and that the other is an autocracy. For
analytical convenience, we maintain the assumption that the leaders of the two nations in
period t = 1 are identical with respect to their preferences; that is to say, R = I. In this
case, the rst-order conditions for the leaders' optimizing choice of military spending, (13)









(R^ I + I)2 (25b)
26As mentioned above, a greater disagreement between the two political parties (i.e., a larger I >
1
2)
given P < 1 results in a smaller allocation to military spending [see footnote 16]. At the same time, however,
an increase in I implies that the minimum savings in military spending required to make war preferable
( m1) is smaller [see equation (21)], and signing the net eect on  ZDD is not possible.













is both necessary and sucient to make the likelihood of war between two identical democracies smaller
than that between two identical democracies:  ZDD >  ZRR. A sucient condition for this inequality to hold,
given I > ^ I, is that I > ^ Ia
1
1 .
22To economize on notation, let R = a, with a  1. Then, these allocations to mili-
tary spending with the specication of the technology of conict (15b) imply the following














(a^ I + I)
: (26b)
Thus, as revealed by the expressions above, the optimizing choices of military spending by
the two countries (25) imply that the democracy will have an eective advantage in securing
resources for period t = 2 under settlement (z(mI
1 ;mR
1 ) > 1
2) if and only if a^ I > I.
Of course, the conditions for each nation to want to initiate a war also depend on
the (given) arming decisions in the previous period, mI
0 and mR
0 |or, more specically,
z(mI
0;mR
0 ). To x ideas, suppose that z(mI
0;mR
0 ) = z(mI
1 ;mR
1 ). Then, from equations
(25) and (26) and the expected two-period payos under settlement and war, respectively
equations (19) and (20) with the appropriate substitutions for the autocratic ruler (i.e.,
~ P = 1, implying that ~  = R = I, and ~  = R = a), one can derive the threshold levels
of the contestable resource (Z), above which the respective nation would choose to initiate
war:
Z >  ZDR 
















Z >  ZRD 
a
1











The subscript \DR" (\RD") indicates the threshold value of Z for a democracy (autocracy)
when paired against an autocracy (democracy). Of course, for war to break out, it is
sucient that only one of these two conditions be satised. Note rst that, as in the case
where the two countries are identical, the threshold values of Z shown above fall as the
future becomes relatively more important (i.e., a larger ), making the likelihood of war
greater.
Turning to the implications of democratic institutions, consider rst the case where
there is no disagreement within the democracy, so that I = 1   I = N = 1
2, implying
that ^ I = I. Then, electoral uncertainty becomes irrelevant, and the only meaningful
distinction between the two nations is that the democratic leader can mobilize resources
more easily ( < R or a > 1). As such, the democratic leader has a greater incentive than
the autocratic ruler not only to arm but to initiate a war as well:  ZDRj^ I=I >  ZRDj^ I=I.
More generally for ^ I  I, equation (25) with R = a shows that an exogenous increase
in a (or in R given ) reduces the autocratic ruler's incentive to arm and increases that
23for the democratic leader if I > a^ I or decreases that incentive if I < a^ I. In either
case, from (26), it implies an increase in the likelihood of success in war for the democracy,
z(mI
0;mR
0 ) = z(mI
1 ;mR
1 ). The smaller incentive to arm for the autocratic ruler means not
only a smaller possible savings in future arming under war, but also a smaller probability
of winning such a war. As such, an increase in a reduces the autocratic ruler's incentive
to initiate war: @  ZRD=@a > 0. At the same time, even though the possible savings in
arming for the democracy might fall with an increase in a, the greater likelihood of possibly
winning a war against the autocracy is suciently large to make war more appealing relative
to peaceful settlement for the democratic leader: @  ZDR=@a < 0.
Of course, as before, given disagreement between the policymaker and the challenger in
the democracy, electoral uncertainty matters. In particular, assuming I > 1
2 > 1 I = N
that implies ^ I < I, a decrease in P < 1 implies a lower weight attached to any given
amount of future resources for the democratic leader (^ I). Using (25) with R = a and
the denition of ^ I  PI + (1   P)(1   I), one can conrm that a decrease in P implies
a decrease in arming by the elected leader and a decrease in arming by the autocratic ruler
if I > a^ I or an increase if I < a^ I. But, in either case, equation (26) shows that a
decrease in P and thus a decrease in ^ I implies a decrease in the likelihood of success in
war for the democracy, z(mI
0;mR
0 ) = z(mI
1 ;mR
1 ). With a smaller possible savings in future
arming and a lower likelihood of victory in the case of war, the democratic leader's incentive
to initiate war falls: @  ZDR=@P < 0. While the potential savings in future arming for the
autocracy when ghting against the democracy might decline with the democratic leaders's
probability of reelection, the greater likelihood of winning such a war is suciently large to
unambiguously increase the autocratic ruler's incentive to ght: @  ZRD=@P > 0.
4.3.3 How war prone are democracies relative to autocracies?
With the results obtained above, we can tease out some additional implications regarding the
war-proneness of the various dyads. First, observe from (23) and (27a) that  ZDD <  ZDR
holds when I > a^ I, or equivalently from (26a) when z(mI
0;mR
0 ) = z(mI
1 ;mR
1 ) < 1
2.
That is to say, the democratic leader will be more willing to initiate a war against another
(identical) democracy than against an autocracy precisely when the probability of winning
the period t = 1 war against another (identical) democracy is larger than that against an
autocracy. At the same time, from (24) with  = R(= a) and (27b), I > a^ I implies
that  ZRR >  ZRD, meaning that the autocratic ruler is less willing to ght another (identical)
autocracy than ght a democracy.
To get a deeper sense of these implications, consider the case where democracies are
most likely to be peaceful|that is, where they have no inherent advantage in mobilizing
resources (a = 1). In the presence of electoral uncertainty (P 2 [0;1)), this assumption
24implies that I > a^ I and furthermore that  ZDD >  ZRR.28 It follows then in this special
case that, while the democratic leader is less likely to initiate a war against an autocracy
than against an identical democracy, the autocratic ruler is generally more willing to initiate
a war|that is,
 ZDRja=1 >  ZDDja=1 >  ZRRja=1 >  ZRDja=1:
But, keeping in mind that it takes only one of the two countries to initiate a war, these in-
equalities support the dyadic hypothesis. In particular, democracy-autocracy dyads are
more war prone than are autocracy-autocracy dyads, which are more war prone than
democracy-democracy dyads. As the relative tax ineciency parameter for autocracies
a rises above one, the analysis remains consistent with the dyadic hypothesis, provided that
I > a^ I and other restrictions on the parameters are satised.29
More generally, however, as a > 1 increases the ordering the dyads according to how
prone they are to war becomes more complicated. It is possible, for example, even when
I > a^ I, that  ZRR >  ZDD holds, indicating that two identical democracies are more war
prone than are two identical autocracies. As a rises suciently so that I < a^ I and hence
 ZDD >  ZDR and  ZRD >  ZRR, it is necessarily the case that  ZRR >  ZDD holds at the same
time.30 In this case, democracy-autocracy dyads are more war prone than are democracy-
democracy dyads, which are more war prone than autocracy-autocracy dyads. In any case,
this logic rules out the possibility that democracy-democracy dyads are less war-prone than
are democracy-autocracy dyads, which are less war-prone than are autocracy-autocracy
dyads in the present setting.31
28See footnote 27.
29A sucient but not necessary condition for the inequalities above to hold (without imposing the restric-
tion that a = 1) is that I > a
1
1  ^ I. This condition is sucient to imply  ZDD >  ZRR (again, see footnote
27); in turn, it implies I > a
2 
2(1 ) ^ I which is sucient to imply that  ZDR >  ZRD, as well as I > a^ I; as
noted above, this last inequality is both necessary and sucient for  ZDR >  ZDD and  ZRR >  ZRD to hold.

























But, this last inequality can never hold for a  1, as can be veried by noting that the right hand side is
smallest at the minimum value of a(= 1), and increases in a at a faster rate than one.
31This particular ordering (the monadic hypothesis) requires  ZDD >  ZRR along with  ZDD >  ZDR and
 ZRD >  ZRR.
255 Concluding remarks
While scholars in political science have long been interested in the interactions between
domestic political institutions and international conict, economists have only begun study
how democratic institutions might inuence outcomes of interstate conict. A central ques-
tion of this large and growing literature is whether we might expect the recent spread of
democracy to bring about a more peaceful world. The objective of the present chapter is
more modest, not to provide a comprehensive analysis of how democratic institutions mat-
ter, but to highlight two specic and potentially osetting features of such institutions|
namely, to give rise to electoral uncertainty and possibly to make resource mobilization
easier.
The analysis has shown how the democratic peace need not be due to the eect of war
outcomes on the likelihood that the incumbent leader maintains power, which can itself dier
across political regimes. Here the driving force behind the eect of democratic institutions
to weaken the severity of conict (as reected in the amount of resources diverted from
production or the likelihood of war initiation) is through the reduced the importance of the
future relative to today implied by electoral uncertainty. Insofar as there is disagreement
between the incumbent political party and the challenger and at the same time there is a
strictly positive probability of losing power to the challenger, the incumbent discounts the
future benet of arming today and furthermore of initiating war today.
At the same time, however, democratic institutions can make conict more severe. In
particular, insofar as democratic institutions include a system of checks and balances that
give the leader (of either party) a more eective means of mobilizing resources, democratic
nations could be more prone to conict, as reected in a higher level of arming and a
greater likelihood of war initiation. Even when the conditions that make two democracies
more peaceful than two autocracies hold, democracy-autocracy dyads are more war-prone
than are autocracy-autocracy dyads.
Of course, in abstracting from the other eects of political institutions that have been
highlighted in the literature, the analysis might seem somewhat limited. Indeed, one im-
portant extension left for future research would be to consider explicitly the role of political
institutions in inuencing the relationship between the survival probability of the incumbent
ruler or elected ocial and the decision to participate in international conict. By looking,
in particular, at how disagreement between individuals or groups of individuals plays out
through alternative political institutions (democracy vs. autocracy), while allowing for the
possibility that the autocratic ruler can be removed from power, it might be possible to
shed new light on how such institutions matter for both domestic and international conict
and how the two sorts of conict are themselves related.
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A Appendix: Equilibrium determination of P
Individual j's voting decision at the end of period t = 1 depends on the level of consumption
that he can expect when party k = I remains in power relative to that when the other party
k = N takes oce. Without any loss of generality, assume that indierent voters support
the incumbent. In addition, for analytical convenience, assume that the two parties place
opposite weights on the two types of public peaceful investment: 1   N = I. In this
case, equation (8) implies that iI
2 = iN
2 , and furthermore that nI
A2 = nN
B2. Then, equation
(1) implies that voter j is willing to vote for party I if and only if j  1
2. Thus, voter
j's voting decision in period t = 2 is independent of the rst-period incumbents military
spending. Moreover, the probability that party I is reelected in period t = 2 is simply the
probability that the median voter, identied by m, places an equal or greater weight on
type-A public peaceful investment: P = Prob(m > 1
2). That is to say, the probability of
reelection is determined independently of the previous period's military spending.
Note that this independence holds also when one considers also the decision to settle
peacefully or to go to war as studied in section 4.
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